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Mr. Einhorn: If OSI is unable to prove actual complicity in Nazi war crimes, what the 
court will then do is say that the misrepresentations that have been proved by the 
government were not "material." And that is how you lose. 
CANADIAN RESPONSES 
Professor Howard Stanislawski: l Our third panel today is concerned with the Canadian 
Responses to World War Two war criminals and human rights violators. Our speakers 
will be David Matas,2 and Professor Irwin Cotler.3 David, would you care to begin? 
Mr. David Matas: Thank you. I wish to address the recent decision of the Commission 
of Inquiry on War Criminals not to go to the Soviet Union to seek evidence there. I 
disagree with that decision. I want to tell you why I disagree, and what I think the 
Commission should be doing. 
First, let me present to you a chronology of the relevant events. The Commission, 
on September 13, 1985, asked counsel for parties with standing before the Commission 
to present their views as to the legality and advisability of collecting evidence abroad 
from the U.S.S.R. and four other countries. Counsel for the Commission was heard on 
September 23, October 3, and October 10. The Commission, on November 14, 1985, 
decided that seeking the evidence abroad was both legal and advisable, provided six 
basic conditions were met. 
The six basic conditions were confidentiality, independent interpreters, access to 
original documents, access to witnesses' previous statements, freedom of examination of 
witnesses in agreement with Canadian rules of evidence, and videotaping. The Com-
missioner also decided that he, himself, would not go abroad. Instead, he would appoint 
a deputy. 
The Commission wrote to the Soviets on November 26, 1985, asking the Soviets to 
locate some 70 witnesses and provide information about any other witnesses, concerning 
15 persons. At the time of the November 14 decision and the November 26 letter, the 
deadline of the Commission was December 30, 1985. On December 12, 1985, the 
Commission deadline was extended to June 30, 1986. 
The Soviets replied, by letter received at the Commission May 1, 1986, that the 
Soviets could receive Commission representatives, after June 10, to examine 34 witnesses 
1 Professor Stanislawski is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College and a 
lecturer in Social Studies at Harvard University. He is a specialist in international relations. Professor 
Stanislawski served as Associate National Director of the Canada-Israel Committee. He also has 
worked for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 
2 Mr. Matas is an attorney in Winnepeg, Canada. He has served as a law clerk to the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. Mr. Matas's activities include acting as a legal coordinator 
for Amnesty International, Canadian Section. He has served as Chairman of the Canadian Jewish 
Congress's Legal Committee on War Crimes, and as Chairman of the League for Human Rights 
of B'nai Brith Canada. 
3 Professor Cotler is an associate professor of law at McGill University Law School and has 
taught international human rights at Harvard Law School. His activities include helping to defend 
Anatoly Scharansky. He is also active in anti-apartheid work. Professor Cotler has testified before 
the Deschenes Commission, the Canadian commission assigned the task of shaping Canada's policy 
regarding World War Two persecutors. From 1977-1980, Professor Cotler was President of the 
Canadian Jewish Congress. He is one of the original members of the Holocaust/Human Rights 
Research Project's Advisory Board. 
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in connection with the crimes of two war criminals. The Soviets said they were continuing 
to look for witnesses and documents implicating other war criminals. 
The Commission had its last public hearings four days after receipt of this letter, 
on May 5 and May 6 in Hull. Neither the Commissioner nor the Commission counsel 
mentioned receipt of this correspondence at the time of the hearing. 
Commission counsel, Michael Meighen and Yves Fortier, replied by letter dated 
May 7, 1986, asking for the names of the witnesses, the language in which they would 
give evidence, and the location in which they would give evidence. Counsel also asked 
for assurances that the safeguards set out in the Commission's decision would be met. 
A. Makarov, the Soviet chargee d'affaires in Canada replied by letter dated May 26, 
1986, that, within the framework of the legislation of criminal procedure of the Ukrai-
nian S.S.R., Canadian lawyers would be given the opportunity to clarify all questions of 
interest to them. Videotaping and independent interpreters would be permitted. 
Commission counsel then wrote back, on May 29, 1986, noting that no reference 
had been made to two Commission safeguards; access to original documents, and wit-
nesses' previous statements. The letter of Commission counsel complained that confi-
dentiality had been breached, because the Soviets had revealed to certain Canadian 
journalists the names of the two people concerned. Finally, it was the view of Commission 
counsel that the Soviets rejected freedom of examination of witnesses as provided for 
by the Canadian rules of evidence, because the Soviets referred to their own criminal 
procedure framework. In response, counsel maintained that the Commission would not 
go to the Soviet Union to examine witnesses, but that it would reconsider its decision, 
should the Soviet position change. The Commission then extended its deadline from 
June 30 to September 30. 
The Soviets replied on June 9, 1986, that all conditions would be accepted. They 
wrote that they would provide documents and witnesses in accordance with procedural 
regulations laid down in the decision of the Commission. In the Soviet letter, the phrase 
"in accordance with the procedural regulations laid down in the decision of the Com-
mission" was underlined. 
Commission counsel replied on June 11, 1986, that all conditions had been met, but 
stated that the Commission could not go in any case because of the passage of time 
between the initial request and the eventual reply of June 9, 1986. The letter pointed 
out that the Commission already examined a good deal of evidence in Canada. The 
Commission asserted its willingness to spend one month collecting evidence about two 
persons. 
That is basically the chronology of events. Let me now say why I disagree with what . 
was done. First of all there is the timing. The Commission was prepared to go to the 
Soviet Union on November 26, to examine 70 witnesses, when its own deadline was 
December 30, five weeks later. It was prepared to go on May 29, to examine the 34 
witnesses, when its deadline was June 30, a month later. Yet, it was not prepared to go 
on June 11, when its' deadline was three and one half months away. I say if the Com-
mission had time to examine 70 witnesses between November 26 and December 30, if it 
had time to examine 34 witnesses between May 29 and June 30, it also has time to 
examine these 34 witnesses between June 11 and September 30. 
There is also the question of who is doing the examining. The Commissioner decided 
that he would not go himself but that he would deputize another or others. In fact, 
Commission counsel Yves Fortier and Michael Meighen have been deputized for the 
purpose. So, Mr. Justice Deschenes does not have to be concerned about his own time 
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being taken up in the examination overseas. If Messrs. Fortier and Meighen are them-
selves too busy to go, the Commissioner can deputize someone else. There is surely 
someone in Canada, in whom the Commission has confidence, who can spend the time 
to go to the Soviet Union between now and September 30. 
Then there is the untimeliness of the objection. The Commission raised its objection 
about going, because of the time involved in examining 34 witnesses, not in its letter of 
May 7, or in its letter of May 29, but in its letter of June 11. The Commission should 
have taken the objection at the first possible opportunity. Obviously, if the Commission, 
on June 11, felt that it did not have time to examine the witnesses, it must also have felt 
it did not have time to examine those witnesses when its deadline was one month away. 
Yet, on May 29, the Commissioner made no objection based on time. The exchange of 
correspondence with the Soviets was, in retrospect, a charade. 
Next, there was the illogical inversion of numbers. When the Commission says it 
does not have time to examine 34 witnesses over the period of a month, it leaves the 
impression that, if the witnesses were fewer, the Commission might have had time to 
examine them. Yet, it makes little sense to suggest that the less the evidence, the more 
likely it would be that the Commission would look at it. To my mind, the reverse should 
be true. The Commission should be more inclined to go to the Soviet Union the greater 
the evidence, rather than the lesser the evidence. 
There is also the inflexibility of the Commission. Because the Commission did not 
have time to examine 34 witnesses, it would examine none. In fact, the Commission, if 
it wished, could examine some of the 34, instead of all of them. This option was simply 
not pursued. 
There was the eagerness to seek a disagreement. I do not read, as Commission 
counsel did, the Soviet letter of May 26, 1986, as rejecting the Commission conditions. 
At worst, it was ambiguous. A clarification was certainly in order. To say, as Commission 
counsel did, "You have not agreed," was to find a disagreement that was not there, as 
subsequent events showed. 
There was insufficient weight given to the value of credibility. While I do not 
question that the Commission has reviewed considerable evidence here in Canada about 
the individuals concerned, by hearing the witnesses abroad the Commission could assess 
their credibility, something that cannot be done here. Even where the Commission has 
prior depositions of the very witnesses offered by the Soviets for examination, talking 
to those witnesses, judging their demeanor, as well as asking probing questions would 
add a dimension to the evidence that is not available simply by reading documents in 
Canada. 
There is the limited focus the Commission has put on the issue. What is at issue is 
not just the evidence against two individuals. It is the reliability of evidence, generally, 
obtained from the Soviet Union. The suggestion has been raised that the Soviets will 
agree to any and all conditions, but then violate the conditions once the taking of evidence 
begins. The Commission could and should test that assertion. I believe it would be of 
value to the Government to have the Commission go over to the Soviet Union and report 
on its experience, and on whether the safeguards were, indeed, correct. 
Then there is the hypocrisy of focusing on Soviet delay. When I say hypocrisy, I do 
not mean that the Commission has been slow. The Commission itself has been expeditious 
in its work. However, I think Canada, as a country, is being hypocritical. Canada waited 
forty years even to begin to act systematically about alleged Nazi war criminals in Canada. 
After this forty year delay by the Government, it is hypocritical for a government 
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Commission to complain of Soviet delay of five months, from November 26, 1985 to 
May 1, 1986. 
Next there is the need for immediate action. We are talking about witnesses who 
saw events over forty years ago, and were old enough to understand and remember 
them. The witnesses are, at best, in late middle age. Most of them will be elderly. Even 
if government lawyers end up going to the Soviet Union after the Commission reports, 
witnesses alive now may be dead then. Not examining witnesses now may mean missing 
an opportunity that will never recur. 
There is also the reversal of the previous decision of the Commission, made without 
a hearing. The Commission may not have been obligated to hold a hearing originally. 
It may not have been required to give parties with standing before the Commission an 
opportunity to argue whether seeking evidence abroad was legal or advisable. However, 
once the Commission did hold a hearing and decided, after the hearing, that it was both 
legal and advisable to go abroad to' collect evidence provided certain conditions were 
met, the Commission makes a mockery of its own proceedings when it reverses its 
decision, without a hearing. The hearing the Commission held turns out to have been a 
feigned hearing. Reversal of the decision without a hearing is unfair to everyone who 
took part in the original proceeding. 
There was the negating of expectations. Once the Commission decided it was legal 
and advisable to go to the Soviet Union to collect evidence, provided certain conditions 
were met, the reasonable and legitimate expectation was that the Commission would go. 
The Commission decision was tantamount to a conditional undertaking that it would go. 
By not going, the Commission breached the undertaking. It is in the interests of good 
administration that any administrative body which reaches a decision should implement 
its decision. It is in the interests of justice that any representative of a justice system 
should honor its undertaking. 
There was the appearance of political interference. Controversy has surrounded 
the Commission's decision as to whether it should go to the Soviet Union. I have heard 
the opinion expressed, within the Ukrainian and Baltic communities in Canada, that the 
Commission should not go to the Soviet Union under any circumstances. A lobbying 
campaign has been focussed on members of Parliament on this very issue. 
I do not believe that the Government told the Commission not to go to the Soviet 
Union. Nor do I believe that the Commission decided not to go to the Soviet Union for 
political reasons. I believe that the reasons the Commission gave for not going were the 
real reasons. However, they were not good reasons. 
There is a commonplace maxim that justice must not only be done, it must also 
appear to be done. In this context, what that maxim means is that justice must not only 
be free from political interference, it must also appear to be free from interference. The 
Commission has reversed a politically controversial decision in an unfair manner. That 
reversal cannot help but give the appearance of political interference. There is a wide-
spread belief that the Commission acted for political reasons. I do not, as I said, share 
that belief. I do feel, however, that the Commission must take full responsibility for the 
prevalence of that belief. 
This whole experience leads me to a number of recommendations. There are, I 
think, lessons for the government of Canada. These events show that the evidentiary 
work needed in order to bring Nazi war criminals in Canada to justice cannot end with 
the Commission. If the evidence now available in the Soviet Union is not collected by 
the Commission, then the Government must collect it. Even if the Commission reverts 
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to its original decision and does decide to collect the available evidence on the two named 
individuals, there remain the witnesses and the other 13 individuals named by the 
Commission in its original letter to the Soviets. It is going to take a continuing effort, 
beyond the mandate of the Commission, to obtain all the evidence available. 
I have four suggestions for the Commission, which I shall communicate to the 
Commission directly, and which I now pass on to you. 
First, the Commission should revert to its earlier decision. It should examine the 
witnesses available to it in the Soviet Union. Before the Commission, I have represented 
the League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith Canada. Harry Bick, the President of B'nai 
Brith Canada, today released a statement deeply regretting the decision of the Commis-
sion not to go to the Soviet Union to collect available evidence, expressing concern that 
the Commission has reneged on its earlier decision, and urging the Commission to 
reconsider. 
Second, I suggest that the Commission, if it does not have time to interview all 34 
witnesses, choose the witnesses that it would be most useful to interview. The Commission 
should, at least, interview these witnesses. 
Third, if neither Yves Fortier nor Michael Meighen have the time to go over to the 
Soviet Union to collect evidence, the Commission should deputize someone else to 
conduct the examinations. 
Fourth, before the Commission comes to a final conclusion as to whether it should 
reverse its earlier decision, it should hold a hearing on the issue. Counsel for all the 
parties who originally argued the issue should be invited to make representations. 
By way of conclusion, let me say that I have been and remain a supporter of the 
Commission. I welcomed its appointment. I believe it has been doing good work and 
will come out with a useful report. Because I believe in the importance of the work of 
the Commission, I make these remarks tonight. The misstep the Commission has just 
made taints its credibility and undermines the impact of the report it will make. The 
Commission has cast disrepute on its own work. 
We must remember that when the Commission reports, it does so privately to the 
Government. I expect the Government will release the historical and legal portions of 
the report. I do not expect the Government to release the part of the report naming 
individuals. We may never know if the two individuals against whom there are now 
witnesses available in the Soviet Union were named in the Commission report. All we 
will know is whether the Commission did its work properly and thoroughly. If it proceeds 
on its present course, we will have to say it did not. I urge that the Commission revert 
to its original decision, so that we can say that it did. 
Professor Irwin Cotler: As David put it, the first inquiry ever into the question of bringing 
suspected Nazi war criminals to justice in Canada began with the creation of what has 
come to be known as the Deschenes Commission, also known as the Commission of 
Inquiry on War Criminals, specifically those relating to Nazi war crimes. It was set up 
in February of 1985. Its mandate was to terminate at the end of December 1985, though 
it has been. given a six-month extension. It will now conclude its mandate, if no other 
extension is provided, by the end of June 1986. The mandate orders the Commission 
to take all necessary steps to bring suspected Nazi war criminals in Canada to justice. 
The terms of reference are threefold. First, are there any suspected Nazi war 
criminals in Canada and if there are, is there any evidence to bring them to justice? 
Second, if there are Nazi war criminals in Canada, how did they enter Canada and did 
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the Canadian government or any of its officials facilitate their entry? Third, are there 
any existing legal remedies to bring the criminals to justice and, if not, are there any 
remedies that can now be enacted as a matter of law? However, as David has pointed 
out, and I think this is a crucial issue, the general mandate, as well as the specific terms 
of reference that I have just described, have been trivialized if not distorted. 
The result is that a human rights issue has been converted, as it were, into an ethnic 
quarrel of Jews versus Ukrainians. Thus, one of the more profound justice issues of our 
times has been characterized as a Jewish revenge issue. Accordingly, in all the submissions 
that David and I have made, respectively, as counsels and on behalf of parties having 
standing before this Commission, the organizing or underlying theme of our remarks 
has been to remind the Commission, the government, and the public, that the presence 
of suspected Nazi war criminals in Canada is a moral outrage, an affront to conscience, 
and a repudiation of everything that Canada and the United States represent. The issue 
is not one of revenge, but one of justice. It is not an ethnic quarrel, but indeed, one of 
the most profound human rights issues of our time. 
Yet having said that, one still finds that an underlying response might be, even if 
not publicly articulated, why now? Why forty years later? Why, for example, are we 
bringing quiet neighbors to justice? The answer is, of course, that we are bringing people 
to justice not for what they have done or not done these past forty years as "quiet 
neighbors," but for the atrocities that they committed during the Second World War, 
for which there is no statute of limitations. Yet, these are questions which many Cana-
dians, and I suspect people in other jurisdictions continue to ask. We therefore must 
offer a compelling moral and judicial basis as to why we are bringing these suspected 
Nazi war criminals to justice. 
Because time does not permit any elaboration of these reasons, I will only identify 
them. The first is what we call fidelity to the rule of law. Simply put, that means that the 
murderers of the innocent shall not go unpunished. Indeed as we have stated, even the 
notion of war criminals is itself a misnomer, because we are prosecuting people not 
because they have been involved in the killing of combatants in the course of a war, but 
rather because they have murdered innocents and persecuted a race. 
The second reason is fidelity to Canadian or American citizenship. Namely, that 
those who secured citizenship under false pretenses should not be permitted to enjoy 
that Canadian or American citizenship, when they certainly would not have been ad-
mitted to our country, let alone granted citizenship, had we known of their crimes. 
The third reason is fidelity to international obligations. Canada and the United 
States year after year have affirmed within the United Nations General Assembly, and 
otherwise, our respected domestic obligations under international law to apprehend, 
arrest, and bring to justice all suspected Nazi war criminals. And a failure to bring 
suspected Nazi war criminals to justice would, in effect, be a breach of our responsibilities 
under international law. 
Another question to address is did the Canadian government facilitate the entry of 
suspected Nazi war criminals into Canada? How, in fact, did they get in? Again, without 
elaboration both David and I can tell you that the hearings before the Deschenes 
Commission and the disclosure of previously secret documents have revealed some 
disconcerting, and even shocking, revelations about the presence of suspected Nazi war 
criminals in Canada, and the manner in which the Canadian government facilitated their 
entry. Let me identify a number of these rather disturbing revelations. These revelations 
are of such a nature that they not only expose a pattern of Canadian government inaction 
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over the last forty years, but, if taken together, raise a reasonable apprehension of 
obstruction of justice on the part of the Canadian government. I realize that these are 
tough words, but there are no other words to describe not only governmental inaction, 
but also its conscious refusal to bring suspected Nazi war criminals to justice. 
First, one previously secret communique from the United Kingdom in 1948 to 
Commonwealth countries, including Canada, called upon them to terminate prosecutions 
of suspected Nazi war criminals on the grounds that the time had come "to bury the 
past." Canada, along with the other Commonwealth countries, not only acquiesced to 
this request, which is a scandalous indictment of United Kingdom policy and practice at 
the time, but also kept this acquiescence secret until it was disclosed before the Deschenes 
Commission. 
A second startling and disturbing revelation was that the Canadian government 
knowingly provided sanctuary for VicP.y collaborators with the French government of 
the Second World War including Count Jacques D'Bonnenville, the right-hand man to 
Klaus Barbie. The Canadian government then moved to passing orders and quashing 
prospective judicial deportation orders against the collaborators. At the same time the 
Canadian government was deporting Jewish refugees that had allegedly entered Canada 
on false passports. The asymmetry of keeping Jewish refugees out, while letting sus-
pected Nazi war criminals in, is disturbing. During the aftermath of the Second World 
War it was easier to get into Canada if you were a Nazi, than if you were a Jew. 
The third thing is what might be called the disturbing innuendo in the Canadian 
government's policy and practice over time of blaming the victim. For example, a secret 
Cabinet communique from 1956 disclosed that when prima facie evidence of suspected 
Nazi war criminals in Canada was presented to the Canadian government, the senior 
officials in the Canadian bureaucracy advised against the government doing anything 
on the grounds that "this would be pandering to Jewish revenge." And so, we had here 
what might be called a classic Orwellian inversion. Rather than bringing Nazi war 
criminals to justice as a matter of domestic and Canadian responsibility, those who were 
asking the government to bring them to justice were, in fact, blamed. Thus, a human 
rights issue was converted into a Jewish revenge issue. 
A fourth disturbing revelation has been destruction of immigration files which the 
Commissioner of the RCMP and the Deputy Solicitor General both characterized as 
crucial with respect to the use of the remedy of revocation of citizenship and deportation. 
What is disturbing about this destruction, even though evidence suggests that files were 
routinely destroyed, is that it took place immediately after the only trial we have had in 
Canada, namely the Ralta case - the extradition of a suspected Nazi war criminal, 
Herman Ralta in May 1983 to West Germany after a year of legal entanglements. 
A fifth disturbing revelation disclosed by records was that the Canadian government 
had a clear and unequivocal policy of no investigation, regardless of how serious the 
allegations were, or of how incriminating the evidence was. I find this somewhat ironic 
because, while I was acting as counsel in another inquiry, the Commission of Inquiry 
into the activities of the RCMP, the RCMP continuously engaged in what might be called 
the "unauthorized investigation" of people in Canada. Yet the Deschenes Commission 
revealed that the RCMP followed a policy of not investigating people that prima facie 
evidence indicated had committed the most serious murders in our times. You can see 
the disturbing asymmetry here. 
This brings me to the final issue, and that is: "Are there any legal remedies avail-
able?" As David and I have tried to point out before the Commission and in our writings, 
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the problem in our view is not the absence of legal remedy, but the absence of political 
will. Thus, the question is not whether there exist any legal remedies to bring Nazi war 
criminals to justice, but which of the existing legal remedies will in fact be exercised to 
undertake both our domestic and, as I indicated earlier, international responsibilities. 
We have identified four main remedies that are available. 
The first, and indeed the preferred remedy, is extradition. However, as we have 
pointed out, the remedy of extradition, while a valid remedy, is ultimately limited. Most 
suspected Nazi war criminals in Canada will remain immune from any legal process, 
because either no one will request their extradition or their extradition may be requested 
from countries with whom Canada does not have an extradition treaty. 
The second remedy which we have suggested is the revocation of citizenship and 
deportation. Here we are treated once again to a kind of Orwellian feast by the Canadian 
government. First we were told that we could not exercise this legal remedy because 
there was no evidence. Then we were told that if there was evidence, then the remedy 
has no legal foundation, and on and on. 
The third remedy, generally speaking, is domestic prosecution or prosecution under 
available criminal law remedies in Canada, to which reference was made this morning. 
Here too we have suggested three approaches: first, prosecution under a statute, which 
we have in Canada, the War Crimes Act, enacted in 1946; second, prosecution under 
the Geneva Convention; third, prosecution under what might be called universal criminal 
or common law. 
A final remedy that we suggested was a worst case scenario. If these existing rem-
edies, for whatever reason, are shown not to have a sufficient persuasive legal basis, then 
we suggested and provided a framework for the enactment of new legislation. Let me 
conclude on this point on the issue of retroactivity, which has been raised time and again 
as being the main obstacle, not only with respect to existing remedies in Canadian 
statutory law, but also with regard to existing law and to the enactment of new law. Our 
response with regard to retroactivity is to suggest once again, as we did concerning the 
term "war criminal," that it is misleading. There is nothing retroactive about war crimes 
or crimes against humanity whose prosecution, in effect, is an invocation of international 
law rather than a breach of either domestic or international law. The consideration we 
put forward was (1) that war crimes and crimes against humanity were always criminal 
under international law, whether it be treaty law or customary international law or United 
Nations law and the like; (2) that murder was always criminal according to the law of 
nations, and it wasn't simply a post-World War II offense; (3) that the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremburg codified these principles; (4) that the War Crimes Act 
and the Geneva Convention are domestic criminal law statutes in Canada, and were in 
effect domestic codifications of existing law, not the creation of new law. They provided 
a forum for the prosecution of existing offenses rather than the enactment of new 
legislation with regard to hitherto nonexistent offenses; (5) and of particular relevance 
to Canada, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was proclaimed in 
Canada in 1982 - our Canadian equivalent to the American Bill of Rights. It provides 
in § 11 G of the Charter, I'm paraphrasing, that "retroactivity shall not avail as a defense 
when the crimes are criminal according to international law or according to the principles 
of the law of nations." In a word, § 11 G of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
is a domestic constitutional codification of these international law principles; (6) the 
Canadian law as well as the Charter must be interpreted in such a way as to not violate 
international law. 
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In conclusion, we end where we began: the presence of Nazi war criminals in Canada 
and the United States or elsewhere, is a moral outrage. Bringing them to justice is a 
matter not only of domestic, but also of international responsibility. It fulfills our re-
sponsibility to law, to Holocaust remembrance, to Canadian citizenship, to international 
obligations, and the like. The legacy of Nuremburg - "never again" - is not only, I 
would say, an exhortation to justice, but a warning against injustice. 
Professor Stanislawski: We only have time for a few questions. I'll hold off my own until 
a later time. Yes? 
Question: I just wanted to ask about the question of universal jurisdiction. What you're 
saying is, that given universal jurisdiction, Canada should be the one to try these people? 
Professor Cotler: Well, we're saying that we were trying to provide either international or 
Canadian remedies, because what happens with the "either or" philosophy is that if you 
lose on one and that's the only one, then you're done. We're saying that these remedies 
are mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive, and that the issue therefore is 
which amongst the remedies is the most preferred, rather than which of the remedies 
is the only one to be exercised. Then you have a situation of revocation of citizenship 
and deportation or domestic prosecution. 
Revocation of citizenship for deportation may be a protracted legal process, but may 
have certain benefits with respect to the evidentiary character of the process and stan-
dards of proof. The adversarial proceeding of a criminal process may be more problem-
atic. We're saying okay, if you can't use that remedy then move with regard to domestic 
prosecution, as well as prosecution from a "political point of view." I'm using that term 
in a larger public policy sense. It does have, in that sense, the support of the oppressed 
nationalities that David has mentioned, because it does not presumably and ultimately 
involve a deportation to a country they object to with regard to the whole issue, i.e., the 
Soviet Union, or Eastern Block nations. 
Finally, three things distinguish the Canadian situation from the American situation: 
(1) the Canadian Geneva Conventions Acts and the War Crimes Act, which provide a 
statutory basis for prosecution; (2) we are ready, having the criminal code, and the 
incorporation by reference of the universality theory of jurisdiction. Canadian law covers 
such diverse potentially international issues as the theft of nuclear materials and the 
kidnapping of diplomats. Thus, it would be consistent for Canada to include in the 
genre of those universal offenses war criminals, or those who committed crimes against 
humanity, because presumably the jurisdictional basis is already there in the criminal 
code. Why not also include, along with other universal offenses, the elite of this genre 
of offenses - war crimes and crimes against humanity; (3) most importantly, as I 
indicated earlier - we have a constitutional basis for recovery. The Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms § 11 G has effectively codified on a constitutional basis the use 
of the criminal law process to bring suspected Nazi war criminals to justice. I said clearly 
and unequivocally that retroactivity shall not avail as a defense against prosecution in 
that regard. 
Thus, I think there are distinguishable features in terms of the Canadian and 
American law. But I think as well that there are certain parallel aspects which would 
make, in my view, a theory of universal jurisdiction and prosecution, under what is 
sometimes called universal criminal law, also applicable here in the States. 
1988] HOLOCAUST CONFERENCE 43 
Question: I wanted to address something that Mr. Matas said in his talk. A perception by 
the Canadian press that this is not only delegitimization of their national liberation 
struggle, but also a matter of an ethnic slur or a form of group libel against the Lithuanian 
or the Ukrainian people. I wanted to address that point because earlier when Mr. Ryan 
was speaking he implied, for instance in portraying and characterizing the displaced 
persons that settled in Austria and Germany after World War II, that there is a pre-
sumption of guilt and of complicity on the part of Ukrainian or Lithuanian people in 
these kinds of war crimes. In my opinion, that sort of a statement makes many Ukrainian 
and Lithuanian people upset, and breeds a tremendous amount of resentment within 
those communities. This seems to be a form of character assassination against a whole 
people. I was hoping that Mr. Matas could address this point and also that Mr. Ryan 
could address that point because that is something that has been glossed over. 
Mr. Matas: Well, actually what you say is true. I mean, it was glossed over, because he 
was passing me little notes - I have three minutes; I had two minutes - and so I did 
skip part of my text as I was going along. I don't know if it's fair to ask Mr. Ryan to 
answer that question because I don't know if he was here for all of what I said. I think 
that what I was concerned about is not that these are slurs, on that point you're right. 
It's not normally proper to identify a criminal by his ethnic origin. We don't consider it 
proper here, and I think that in general it shouldn't be done. What I said in the text, 
and maybe I shouldn't have skipped it, is that the problem is not a legal one, it's a 
journalistic one. It's the way these cases are reported sometimes, and that's very often 
what these communities are reacting against. What I'm commenting on here is not the 
fact that they are reacting to them so much as the differential reaction to them. 
I think if any community in North America is concerned about the Nazi war criminal 
efforts from the point of views of ethnic slurs, it would be the German community. But 
their reaction is nowhere near the reaction of the Ukrainians and Baits. If you listen to 
the list that Allan Ryan gave of the people who came over to this country, he mentioned 
the Ukrainians, he mentioned the Baits, but he also mentioned the Russians as part of 
that group. The Russians within North America are generating nowhere near the same 
reactions as the Ukrainians and the BaIts. So I say, "Sure slurs are wrong," but when 
you look at the differential reaction to the slurs, the concern that these people have is 
not that they are being slurred in a North American context, rather the concern is that 
they feel that their nationalistic aspirations are being discredited by the slurs. 
Question: You would agree that they are being slurred on some level? 
Professor Cotler: Yes, but what I am trying to do is explain the opposition to the efforts 
to bring Nazi war criminals to justice, and the opposition doesn't come from these ethnic 
designations. If that was true the opposition would come from the Germans, from the 
Russians, from every other nationality. I mean Trief has been identified as a Romanian 
and the Romanian community hasn't protested the way the Ukrainian community pro-
tested about Demjanjuk or the Croatian community contested about Artukovic, so if 
you're looking for explanations to opposition, the designations are not the problem. The 
problem lies elsewhere. 
Mr. Ryan: I have said this many times before and I'm having to say it again. I have 
neither abused nor would I ever classify any nationality, nation or people to be a nation 
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of collaborators. Every country that was occupied by the Nazis from 1939 to 1945 was 
populated by collaborators. In every country there were resistance fighters and heroes. 
I think that as a matter of history, you can say that the level of collaboration was higher 
in some countries. But that is not an attempt on my part to say that nationality is a 
presumption of guilt. 
The extent of collaboration in the Baltic countries and the extent of collaboration 
in the Ukraine was, in my opinion, as high as any in Europe. That is not to say that 
there were not resistance efforts there. It is also a fact that under the Displaced Persons 
Act, there were overt preferences given to Baltic nationals and there were indirect 
preferences given to Ukrainians. As a result, if you look at the nationality of people that 
came to this country, you find those nationalities very heavily represented. It was very 
difficult for Germans to come to this country and Austrians to come to this country in 
the 1948 to 1952 period. So from these nations that had substantial levels of immigration 
to this country, inevitably what you get is a margin of collaborators and war criminals 
who are Latvian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Hungarian, Yugoslavian, and virtually every 
other European nationality. The collaborators of France, for example, stayed in France. 
The collaborators in England stayed in England. They did not come to this country. So, 
it is essential to review not only the historical pattern of collaboration during the war, 
but the historical pattern of immigration to the United States after the war. 
I have met with leaders of the Ukraine, along with Baltic leaders of this country, 
and I have tried to explain this in great detail. In fact, I once addressed a meeting of 
the Ukrainian American Bar Association in which I answered questions for three hours 
on the subject. It does not seem to have had any effect. 
I read the Ukrainian Weekly, which seems to be fairly responsible in covering these 
issues and I have been dismayed to find it widely believed that the OSI was out to get 
Ukrainians. I think it's shameful that some leaders in that community are preying on 
fears of innocent people, who did nothing more than cut a few years off their age when 
they applied to come to this country, by implying that the U.S. Justice Department may 
be knocking down their doors tonight to send them back to the Soviet Union. I think 
that is an irresponsible and shameful attempt to stir up anti-Justice Department actions. 
I want to make it clear that I have never characterized any nation in terms that I 
would consider libelous or anything like that. Every case brought that I've been involved 
with has been directed only against the individual who is on trial. 
My final point is that I think it's terribly unfortunate that ethnic leaders in this 
country have rallied around someone like Demjanjuk, who has been proven guilty by a 
court of law. I think that if the Ukrainian leaders in this country are serious about what 
they say, namely freeing the Ukrainian name from guilt by association, they would say: 
"Demjanjuk may be guilty, that has been proven in a court of law, but that does not 
make all Ukrainian people guilty." I have said that. I say it again today, and hope 
Ukrainian people would say that. Instead, what they say is that Demjanjuk is not guilty, 
and because the Justice Department and the Soviet Union and the courts and the press 
say he is, they are libeling all of us with the tarred brush of Nazism. I think that is 
absolutely the wrong way to go about it. 
Professor Stanislawski: I have one question which will have to be the last question of this 
session. Professor Cotler, we started the day today with a discussion about German war 
crime trials. We can see that disparate motives may have been at work in Germany in 
regard to those trials. American actions could be understood as a function of the U.S. 
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role as a superpower after World War II, and the anti-Communist motivations that have 
been preeminent in this country. How do you understand the British motives in the 
1948 memorandum that you cited, and the Canadian motives in approving and imple-
menting the contents of that memorandum? What explains the reactions of a country 
like Canada, other countries in the British Commonwealth, and presumably other coun-
tries which were lesser powers after World War II, in their reluctance to proceed on 
these kinds of matters? 
Professor Cotler: Well, one looks over all the documentation, and there have been volumes 
of evidence, both documentary and before the Deschenes Commission. What emerges 
from all this is an absence of any moral sensibility about the Holocaust. The Holocaust 
itself is reduced to a footnote. There is no sense, no appreciation about the horrors of 
the Holocaust. What you have is a kind of bureaucratic mind set that develops, and then 
characterizes the matter as a Jewish revenge issue, rather than, as I said, it being ajustice 
and a human rights issue. There may be a number of reasons that may account for it. 
There may be, and I think the evidence does disclose that there was overt anti-Semitism 
at senior political and bureaucratic levels in Canada. Those who were responsible for 
keeping the Jews out, were also the same people who were responsible for letting the 
Nazis in. 
The second thing is that Britain, in its own communiques, addressed the issue of 
the emerging Jewish politics of the time. So there were these geopolitical things to be 
added to the latent anti-Semitism. 
The third thing, as I said, is the simple bureaucratic mind set. And so you have the 
whole question of bureaucratic inertia. 
Finally, there is a telling ignorance. That is to say that the government repeats over 
and over again that there are no legal remedies available to bring suspected Nazi war 
criminals to justice. And what you have is a kind of, and this is a charitable way of 
putting it, continuing legacy of errors of fact and law. When you take all these things 
together, I think the end result is simply inaction, if not worse. I'm prepared to say, and 
I will continue to say, that in my view, the 40 years of Canadian government inaction 
reveal a knowing obstruction of justice on the part of the Canadian government and 
Canadian officials in the past. 
Professor Stanislawski: I'd like to thank both of our panelists for their presentations, and 
the audience for their support. 

